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JAPAN AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM
by Anthony DiFilippo
It has been frequently stated since the end of the Cold War that the United States 
is the world’s only remaining superpower.1 What is clearly implied by the post-Cold War 
use of the word “superpower” is that for a nation to occupy this status today it must have 
achieved, in addition to its economic power, a unique level of military sophistication. 
Thus a superpower is the favorite in winning any war by conventional means and, most 
importantly, it possesses sufficient nuclear capability to inflict regional and global 
devastation. Although the Japanese military budget today is large compared to the 
majority of other industrial nations,2 Japan fails to meet the accepted criteria of a modern- 
day superpower mainly because it has developed a defensive military posture. While 
some consider Japan to have acquired superpower status because of its economic and 
science and technology accomplishments,4 like in the past, it is much more common 
today to reserve this designation for a country that also has a formidable military force. 
Having the world’s second largest economy, highly advanced science and technology 
capabilities, and first-rate industries that are very competitive and dominant in several 
areas therefore does not qualify Japan to be an authentic superpower.
What is incontrovertibly the biggest political irony in the post-Cold War years is 
that the international community has not exploited the security opportunities of the 
period. Constrained by the enduring mentality of the Cold War, a genuine supeipower 
must still be a military force. This is a serious problem. A current day superpower will 
inevitably sustain a threat structure by promoting mistrust that exacerbates international 
and regional tensions,5 and also by encouraging challenges to its prestigious military
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position -  a prodding effect -  that is supported by advanced science and technology. In 
other words, the existence of a threat structure encourages some other countries to 
maintain or acquire nuclear deterrence by managing science and technology to support 
the development of sophisticated weapons. As countries continue to acquire 
competencies in science and technology, a significant part of the application of this 
knowledge for some, as India and Pakistan have recently demonstrated, will be put to use 
developing nuclear weapons. Together, the retention of Cold War security solutions and 
the prevailing understanding of the meaning of supeipower sustain an international 
system with serious security problems that become more dangerous as time passes.
Japan’s place in the post-Cold War security structure is currently unambiguous. 
Japan has selected thus far to maintain its security relationship with the United States and 
to be an inactive participant in U.N. security operations. But just because Japan’s 
security position is clear does not mean that it is not contradictory. Anti-nuclear 
sentiment in Japan remains very strong,6 and Tokyo has officially acknowledged to the 
International Court of Justice that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the principles 
of human existence.7 Tokyo therefore accepts the nuclear deterrent provided to Japan by 
the United States, even though extended deterrence (that is, deterrence for the nation and 
its specified allies) is only the primary reason for America’s possession of nuclear 
weapons.8 The nuclear policy of the United States does not preclude the possibility that it 
will use nuclear weapons first.9 Should this occur, Japan’s deterrence would be 
immediately lost. Should another country initiate the use of nuclear or other weapons of 
mass destruction against the United States, an American nuclear response would still 
make Japan a target. In either case, therefore, Japan’s nuclear deterrence would be lost,
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as would its official declaration to the World Court that “nuclear weapons must never be 
used.”
A Look Back
For a brief time after the Cold War ended, a good amount of optimism emerged 
concerning the potential for significant changes in global security: the evolving 
international system had reached the point where multilateral solutions to global 
problems seemed to be realistically on the horizon. There was much talk of a “peace 
dividend/’ and with lower military expenditures, a greater sense of political and 
economic diplomacy appeared as the emergent characteristics of the post-Cold War 
international system. The United Nations would be revitalized and assume its 
authoritative position as the genuine steward of international security; as the successor to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
would handle the trade problems that inevitably would emerge in the global economy.
But this optimism relating to the use of multilateralism quickly faded. Pushed by 
the U.S. Congress, the Clinton administration retreated from its previous position that the 
United Nations should take a considerably larger role in international security. Contrary 
to the judgment expressed by the majority of Americans,50 Washington’s decision to 
move away from a U.N.-controlled international security system and toward unilateral 
action has been unmistakable in the last few years. On the economic front, the United 
States has seen the WTO similar to the way it has viewed the United Nations. 
Specifically, if unilateral actions are deemed necessary, then the United States can avoid 
WTO guidelines. For example, Washington has effectively sidestepped the WTO in the
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recent Japan-U.S. supercomputer dispute, choosing instead to impose unilateral anti­
dumping charges on Japanese manufactures, NEC and Fujitsu. Even more recently, 
because of trade problems with Japan, Washington has suggested that it will rely on 
unilateral sanctioning, which is incompatible with WTO rules, and has indicated that 
Japan will be a target.
This unbridled willingness by the United States to respond unilaterally to 
economic and security issues reflects Washington’s confidence in the nation’s 
superpower status. That Washington promotes this status for the nation at the same time 
that other countries acknowledge America’s position makes it difficult to recognize a 
superpower in a different light. Thus the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, the world 
is still seen as a very unsafe place, making it imperative that the United States retain a 
very high level of military preparedness. Although American defense officials see little 
likelihood that the United States will encounter a “global peer competitor” between now 
and 2015, it is important to “maintain military superiority over current and potential 
rivals.” This means, most importantly, that a sufficient nuclear arsenal must be 
maintained and that “for the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to need a 
reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent.”11
Japan’s interest in the emerging multilateral security system that appeared just a 
few years ago has slowly given way to the acceptance of Washington’s global 
perspective.12 Having accepted the argument that the world has not sufficiently changed 
since the end of the Cold War to warrant assuming an international role much different 
from the past, Tokyo has felt compelled to strengthen Japan’s security alliance with the
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United States.13 Aligned with the United States in this way, means that Japan has not 
been able to establish itself as a post-Cold War superpower.
Security Options for Japan
Apart from its present security relationship with the United States, Japan has two 
other major options available to it at the present time. One option would be for Japan to 
develop an offensive-oriented military, perhaps even possessing nuclear weapons.14 The 
second option would require Japan to act on its culturally embedded interests that stem 
from the nation’s belief in U.N.-centered security and nuclear disarmament.
Compared to present conditions, the first option would significantly worsen 
Japan’s regional relations, particularly with Beijing and Pyongyang, and would surely 
create a large amount of uneasiness in Moscow. However, Japan is very unlikely to give 
serious consideration to this option, since this would involve changing its constitution by 
eliminating or revising Article 9, the war-renouncing clause. Selecting this security 
option would concomitantly mean the abandonment of Japan’s anti-militarist and anti- 
nuclear culture, which could conceivably occur incrementally (that is, by maintaining the 
current security alliance with the United States), but which will not take place in the 
immediate future. This cultural transition would also necessitate the conversion of a 
significant part of Japan’s science and technology base, away from civilian and toward 
military work. Currently, Japan devotes only .04 percent of its GDP to defense research 
and development.15 To become a significant military force with offensive capability, 
Japan would need to markedly increase its defense-related research and development.
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To argue that protracted trade disputes with the United States, which Japan has 
actually become somewhat accustomed to over the years, could cause Tokyo to end the 
bilateral security relationship and turn to an autonomous military system is not very 
plausible.16 This argument assumes that the end of the bilateral security alliance would 
leave Japan with no other choice other than remilitarization and, because of its militarist 
past, is associated with the demeaning simile that a fully rearmed Japan would be like 
giving an ex-alcoholic a drink. A sudden loss of faith in the bilateral security alliance by 
Tokyo that is simultaneously accompanied by major changes in the Japanese culture is 
hard to imagine at this time. Tokyo has recently been struggling to implement minor and 
symbolic changes in its security relationship with the United States since the new 
bilateral defense guidelines with Washington were established in September 1997. So to 
talk about Japan possessing an independent military system would amount to a cultural 
revolution -  something that appears very unlikely any time soon.
The other major security option available to Japan encourages it to go to work 
immediately on a new international security paradigm, one that would lead to an entirely 
different conceptualization of global supeipower. The selection of this option would give 
Japan the opportunity to assume international leadership responsibility. To gain the trust 
and confidence of the world community, and particularly its Asian neighbors, Japan 
would need to announce the end of the security alliance with the United States and 
immediately begin to join with other interested nations in strengthening the security 
mechanisms of the United Nations and regional institutions, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.17
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This security option would be consistent with Japan’s anti-militarist and anti-
nuclear culture and with its search for a new international role. Nurtured by Article 9, this
culture took root in Japan after its devastating defeat in the Pacific War, as did the strong
belief that the United Nations would evolve into an institution fully capable of managing
international security. It is important to understand that this security option would not
involve the significant transformation of Japan’s science and technology activities. It
would also place Japan in a international role unimpeded by the constraints of its security
relationship with the United States and would accordingly eliminate the contradiction of
1 ftwanting nuclear disarmament and remaining under America’s security umbrella.
Japan’s existing security-alliance with the United States forces it to remain in the 
position of a follower nation, a position that it has occupied throughout the postwar 
period.19 Because of its security relationship with the United States, Japan is still 
prevented from effectively pursuing its interests relating to the complete abolition of 
nuclear weapons and a strong United Nations capable of promoting and guaranteeing 
international security. Tokyo has also been unable to establish solid relations with all 
Asian countries. Finally, the current bilateral security alliance means -  as it has for a 
number of years -  that Japan is continuously susceptible to American trade and other 
economic demands.
Trade Politics and Security
While Japanese analysts have observed that the U.S.-Japan trade disputes became 
more politicized even when the trade imbalance was improving, they have not 
completely recognized that this politicization process is directly connected to the bilateral
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security alliance. That Japan has been a protectorate of the United States for decades, 
specifically manifested by the security alliance, has meant that Washington has always 
had the upper hand in bilateral trade disputes.21 As Japan continued to develop advanced 
science and technology products, Washington’s trade demands on Tokyo became more 
vociferous. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s bilateral trade disputes often were 
rancorous, with Washington mainly attempting to gain increasing access to Japan’s 
domestic markets. Before this, Washington had focused on the penetration of the U.S. 
markets by Japanese producers. However, at all times Japan, because of its dependent 
position in the unequal security alliance, commonly yielded to Washington’s demands. 
Tokyo did take a noticeably tougher stand in 1994, refusing to concede easily to 
American demands. But it was the reduction of America’s trade deficit with Japan that 
was largely responsible for reducing bilateral trade discord.
Plagued for the last few years by a troubled economy and weak domestic demand, 
Japan’s increasing trade surplus with the United States has recently recaptured the 
attention of Washington policy makers. Visibly at the center of the bilateral trade 
controversy is Japanese steel exports to the United States. But the current trade problems 
between Washington and Tokyo involve more than just this single industry, extending to 
critical technology-intensive sectors such as machine tools and semiconductors. 
Washington’s proposed revival of Super 301, a unilateral trade measure that affords to 
the president the power to sanction any nation judged to be in violation of U.S. laws, is 
particularly upsetting to Tokyo. Referring to the multilateral procedures for dispute 
settlement within the WTO, prime minister Keizo Obuchi recently commented that: “I
8
believe it is reasonable that international trade must be based on international rules. We 
are very much concerned that the U.S. will take unilateral actions.”22
In a similar way that the United States has circumvented the United Nations in its 
treatment of Iraq, it has skirted the WTO rules in dealing with recent trade disputes with 
Japan. But unlike Iraq, Tokyo’s compliance with U.S. demands has been much easier to 
come by. The enduring U.S. criticism of the Japanese “free ride” on security matters and 
Japan’s understanding of its defense dependency immediately puts Tokyo policy makers 
in a disadvantageous bargaining position from the outset of any trade dispute. Business 
leaders in Japan have resented U.S. efforts to manage bilateral trade and other economic 
activities and have worked with government officials in the attempt to alleviate American 
pressure. However, concerns about China and North Korea in the business community23 
and in government24 continue to provide the justification for maintaining the bilateral 
security treaty with the United States. The Japanese public, on the other hand, has not
0 Sdemonstrated unequivocal enthusiasm for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Acquiring Superpower Status
Japan’s accomplishments during the postwar period have been consequential. Its
economy grew from the shambles caused by war to one that significantly affects global
markets. Having completely shed the stigma of “made in Japan,” Japan’s consumer and
• i 06producer goods have become internationally recognized as being of the highest quality. 
Behind this movement to achieve product quality has been the willingness to invest in 
important and often times risky science and technology projects.27 Supporting all of this 
has been Japan’s generous spending on civilian science and technology over the years. .
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Still another important indicator of Japan’s accomplishments has been its budget for 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). For the past several years, Japan has 
consistently led the world in ODA spending.
Despite these major accomplishments, Japan has not identified an international 
role that is much different from the one that it occupied during the Cold War. Tokyo 
continues largely to make the same policy choices that it has been making for years. 
Thus the Japanese vision of the United Nations becoming strong enough to manage 
international security and the anti-militarist and anti-nuclear sentiments that pervade 
Japan all remain suffocated by Washington and Tokyo’s insistence that Cold War 
mechanisms must stay in place.
For Japan to acquire the status of a post-Cold War superpower and at the same 
time retain its anti-militarist culture, it must take significant steps forward in four areas.
• Introduce and advance the international perception that a country does not 
have to develop nuclear weapons and other threatening military systems in 
order to raise national pride.
• Make politically creative use of ODA spending and other types of foreign 
assistance.
• Place more emphasis on diplomatic policy development in both multilateral 
and regional institutions.
• Be willing to use engagement policies in its relations with the United States 
and with other nations that possess or may acquire nuclear weapons.
Developing a Different International Perception o f  Science and Technology
Japan has clearly demonstrated that economic growth and industry development 
need not be tied to a large and burdensome military sector. Japanese defense spending as 
a proportion of GDP (.97%) is by far the lowest of the major industrial nations -  United
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States (3.41%), United Kingdom (2.81%), France (2.58%), and Germany (1.58%).28 
Japan has pledged not to develop nuclear weapons and, acting alone, is not a military 
threat to any nation. Japan has also demonstrated that product quality is directly related to 
sustained and significant efforts in civilian science and technology. Japan has devoted a 
higher percentage of GDP to non-defense research and development than the United 
States for many years, and since at least 1990 it has led the world in this area.
What Japan has not done is to connect its many accomplishments in civilian 
science and technology to its interest in nuclear disarmament. By doing this, Japan would 
be moving in the direction of developing a different international security environment. 
This international culture would permit nations to take pride in using science and 
technology to better the lives of people. As events in India and Pakistan showed in the 
spring of 1998, the nuclear testing performed by both of these countries significantly 
bolstered national pride. Under present international security conditions, it is increasingly 
likely, if not inevitable, that other nations of the world will feel compelled to devote a 
significant portion of their science and technology resources to the development of 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Still other nations will expend 
science and technology resources to maintain these weapons. Not only did the nuclear 
tests conducted by India and Pakistan manifest the failure of the deterrence policy. But 
these activities also confirmed the importance that nations attach to utilizing science and 
technology to develop sophisticated weapons of mass destruction at the expense of 
improving the standard of living for people. In India -  and more than likely in Pakistan as
well -  there is currently more interests in using the nation’s science and technology
* i . .resources for military purposes rather than for economic development. Decisions
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relating to the application of science and technology can play a very critical part in a 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan can provide leadership in this 
area by emphasizing how important it is for nations to apply science and technology 
resources to economic growth and to desist from weapons development projects.
A recent decision by Tokyo, however, has not demonstrated this kind of global 
leadership. Tokyo’s decision to conduct research with the United States to develop a 
regional theater missile defense (TMD) system does not exemplify the use of science and 
technology in a way different from Cold War thinking. Rather than improving regional 
security relations, the use of advanced science and technology to study a TMD system 
will actually make them more tenuous. Potentially complicating this matter more is that 
because both Beijing and Pyongyang have recently announced their intentions to promote 
science,31 they will find a way to challenge the U.S-Japan security alliance. Although a 
TMD system is theoretically “defensive” in design, it nonetheless demonstrates the 
continuing need for science and technology to be used for national security and therefore 
perpetuates an arms race mentality.
China has been highly critical of the announcement by Japan and the United 
States to begin research on a TMD system. Beijing has three concerns. The first relates to 
the promotion of an arms race in space.32 The second relates to the actual intentions of 
Washington and Tokyo. Beijing is disturbed that Tokyo is assisting Washington in 
attempting to neutralize Chinese nuclear forces and is particularly worried that a TMD 
system is a stepped-up bilateral effort to contain China. Thirdly, Beijing is also very upset 
by the suggestion that Taiwan may be protected by the U.S.-Japan TMD shield. This is 
directly related to Beijing’s continuing protestation of the phrase “areas surrounding
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Japan” in the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Beijing has stressed 
that the new bilateral guidelines give Japan regional security responsibilities, which 
include possibly interfering in internal Chinese affairs relating to Taiwan. Some have 
even argued that Beijing sees the development of a TMD system as proof that Tokyo has 
plans to develop nuclear weapons and the potential to strike first.
North Korea has reacted strongly to the planned TMD system. Bilateral relations 
between Tokyo and Pyongyang took a turn for the worse after North Korea launched a 
projectile over Japan in late August 1998, While Pyongyang has repeatedly claimed that 
the projectile was a civilian satellite, Tokyo continues to maintain that the projectile was 
a ballistic missile intended to threaten Japan. In any case, this event persuaded Tokyo that 
joining with the United States to study a TMD system was in the best interests of Japan. 
Pyongyang feels threatened by the TMD system, since it feels that North Korea has been 
targeted as one of the major sources of instability in the East Asia-Pacific region.34
Russia has also expressed apprehension about the regional TMD system proposed 
by the United States and Japan.35 Similar to Beijing, Moscow is concerned that the 
proposed U.S.-Japan TMD system will have a deleterious effect on regional security. 
TMD would give the United States a decided security advantage in the East Asia-Pacific 
region, and Russia can not afford the expense that such a system would entail. It is only 
natural therefore for Moscow to feel uncomfortable with the proposal to build a 
technologically sophisticated anti-missile defense system.
Tokyo’s decision to study the TMD system with United States not only helps to 
sustain a threat environment in the East Asia-Pacific region. But this decision also moves 
Japan away from its formally stated commitment to work cooperatively with the United
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Nations so that this multilateral organization can fulfill its responsibility of becoming the 
principal agent of international peace and security. Japan’s official defense policy and the 
U.S.-Japan security treaty both specifically address the importance of the United Nations 
in assuming international security responsibilities.36 Moreover, a recent survey conducted 
by the Prime Minister’s office during the fall of 1997 showed that the largest proportion 
of respondents wanted Japan to cooperate actively with the United Nations to realize 
global peace and security.37 Studying an advanced military system with the United States 
to shore up security is not the same as actively cooperating with the United Nations to 
achieve international security.
Tokyo’s decision to use the nation’s science and technology resources to support 
a highly advanced TMD system, particularly when other countries view it as a threat to 
their security, contravenes Japan’s postwar interests in a strong and viable United Nations 
and in global disarmament, which manifestly includes the abolition of all nuclear 
weapons.38 Whether intended or not, a decision like this promotes an arms race. Beijing 
has recently commented that: “If a country seeks to develop advanced theatre missile 
defence or even national missile defence in an attempt to obtain absolute security, other 
countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles.”39 Problematic also 
is that Tokyo’s decision to study TMD pushes Japan in the direction of becoming a 
military power. Although developing nuclear weapons for defense is the ultimate activity, 
research on a TMD system is nonetheless on the same political trajectory.40
Japan can assume a responsible global leadership position by demonstrating to 
other countries that advanced science and technology can be used to help build an 
effective security paradigm that is very different from existing approaches that rely on the
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threat and use of force. This new security paradigm would make the United Nations and 
regional fora the central forces in maintaining peace. To some degree, Japan has already 
demonstrated that through a commitment to science and technology a nation’s pride and 
prestige does not have to depend on developing advanced weapons. Drawing on its 
continuing interests in seeing the elimination of all nuclear weapons, Japan could make 
the abolition of these weapons the top priority of this new security paradigm.
A critical component of a nuclear disarmament regime is verification. Broadly 
defined, sophisticated detection technologies are necessary for the successful abolition of 
nuclear weapons. These technologies will be indispensable to verification, since not all 
nuclear weapons and critical material will be easily observable. The Canberra 
Commission has recently pointed that: “Even with a highly intrusive verification regime, 
detection of a well shielded weapons/fissile material cache would be difficult with 
today’s technologies.”41 Japan can put to use its competency in science and technology 
by committing part of its national resources to the development of effective detection and 
monitoring technologies that will strengthen the verification process. Thus just as Tokyo 
announced its intention to begin studying the technologies related TMD, it could, after 
designing and acquiring the support of other nations interested in global disarmament, 
aim some of Japan’s resources to the development of detection technologies.
ODA Spending and Other Foreign Assistance
Through thoughtful use of its ODA budget and other forms of foreign assistance
\
Japan can help fashion its global image of a superpower determined to play a leading part 
in constructing a new international security paradigm. Difficult economic times in recent
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years have caused Japan’s ODA budget to decline; for example, it fell from $14,489 
billion in 1995 to $9,358 billion in 1997. Still, for seven years in a row Japan has devoted 
more to ODA spending than any other advanced nation.42
Japan’s ODA charter mandates that Tokyo monitor the military activities of the 
recipients of Japanese financial assistance. So when Beijing performed nuclear tests in 
1995 Japan responded by canceling grant aid to China. More recently, in the spring of 
1998, when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, Tokyo reacted responsibly by 
cutting off most financial aid to both countries. ,
China, India and Pakistan are leading recipients of Japanese developmental 
assistance. After taking all types of direct Japanese ODA spending into account (grants, 
technical cooperation, and loans), China, India and Pakistan are among the top six 
recipients. In 1996 China was the leading beneficiary of Japanese technical cooperation, 
and the second biggest loan recipient. India and Pakistan have recently been among the 
top twenty five recipients of Japanese technical cooperation and grant aid and have been 
among the top six beneficiaries of loans from Tokyo.43
There is nothing stopping Tokyo from changing its ODA charter and adjusting it 
to a nuclear disarmament regime. After doing this, Tokyo can create incentives for China, 
India, and Pakistan to participate in a nuclear disarmament process. By tying loans, grant 
aid and technical cooperation to specific activities in a nuclear disarmament process (for 
example, the phased elimination of nuclear weapons and material), while maintaining 
current restrictions on military violations, Tokyo would be demonstrating that it has a 
sincere commitment to a disarmament processes and that it is willing to assume a 
leadership role.
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Russia’s current economic problems currently make it susceptible to conditional 
financial and technological incentives from Japan. While Tokyo already provides 
assistance to Russia, it could link additional aid to a plan that coordinates financial 
incentives with Russian compliance to a disarmament process. Tokyo could also broaden 
its existing assistance initiative to the former Soviet Union for dismantling nuclear 
weapons. In April 1993 Tokyo pledged $100 million to the former Soviet Union for the 
purpose of dismantling nuclear weapons. Of this amount, $70 million has been earmarked 
for Russia. In October 1993 Russian president Yeltsin visited Japan. While there, he 
signed a bilateral agreement with Japan designed to help dismantle nuclear weapons. 
This bilateral agreement has three major purposes: the construction of facilities and 
containers to store and transport material from dismantled nuclear warheads, the building 
of sites to process low-level radioactive wastes, and the purchase of machinery and 
equipment for the transportation of weapons to safe locations.44 Tokyo could expand this 
initiative by providing technology, training, and trade incentives in exchange for 
agreements from Russia to make measurable progress in a disarmament process. For this 
same purpose, Tokyo could encourage even more Russians than it currently sponsors 
(about 100 to 200 a year) to study and work in Japanese government institutes, 
universities and corporations. Tokyo could also contemplate ways to enlarge its 
contribution (now at about $20 million) to the International Science and Technology 
Center, again expecting compliance to a global disarmament process in return for 
additional assistance. Begun in March 1994 by the United States, Japan, the European 
Union, and Russia, the main purpose of the Center is to permit scientists and other
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technical workers in the former Soviet Union, who previously worked on weapons of 
mass destruction, to get involved in non-military projects.
Japan can also work harder to normalize relations with North Korea. It can extend 
humanitarian assistance to Pyongyang, as well as other forms of foreign aid, including 
technology that will help with North Korean economic development. By going beyond 
KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization), a consortium effort 
designed to prevent Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons, Tokyo can create the 
genuine impression that it does not represent any threat and that Japan is willing to assist 
in the economic and technological development of North Korea.
Diplomatic Initiatives
For Japan to design a new global security paradigm and to fill the position of 
superpower, it must enlarge its diplomatic responsibilities. Throughout the Cold War 
Japan’s foreign policy relating to disarmament issues within the United Nations typically 
followed the lead of the United States.45 Even though today Japan appears determined to 
acquire a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, its foreign policies too closely 
mirror those of the United Sates. Thus recent Japanese initiatives in the area of global 
disarmament, although they exist,46 fall far short contributing to an international security 
model that is different from what existed during the Cold War. To help put itself in an 
international position that draws on its postwar interests in global disarmament and a 
strong United Nations capable of dealing with security crises, Japan’s diplomatic 
decisions must be made somewhat independent of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.
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Japan’s financial contributions to the United Nations are second only to the 
United States.47 However, despite a much higher financial contribution to the United 
Nations than Germany and Russia, Japan has far fewer people than either of these 
countries holding key positions within this organization. This is something that Japan is 
not comfortable with.48
As a major contributor to the budget of the United Nations and having the second r 
largest economy in the world, Japan should be a permanent member of the Security 
Council. So Tokyo needs to pursue more assertively than it has thus far a permanent seat 
on the Security Council. Tokyo also needs to encourage more of the nation’s citizens to 
seek top positions within the United Nations. But for now the most important thing that 
Tokyo can do is to act on the nation’s anti-militarist and anti-nuclear culture. Tokyo can 
do this by linking this culture to a U.N.-controlled global disarmament process that 
focuses on the abolition of all nuclear weapons.49 Such action needs to be initially 
orchestrated through existing channels within the United Nations. However, Japan could 
also take the lead in strengthening the ASEAN Regional Forum by moving it along to the 
point where it could undertake security responsibilities and by coordinating this 
institution’s activities with the United Nations.
Engaging the United States and Other Nations
Important to the creation of Japan’s image of a post-Cold War superpower is its 
willingness to engage the United States, the other nuclear powers, and nations that may 
obtain nuclear weapons. By designing an international security paradigm that has at its 
core the institution of a global disarmament process, Japan will acquire some political
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latitude to seek compliance from the United States and other nations that either possess or 
may acquire nuclear weapons. Because the deterrence regime has recently proven to be 
susceptible to catastrophic failure, as a result of the tests performed by India and 
Pakistan, and because it will become an even more dangerous strategy as time passes and 
other nations acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, a global disarmament 
process is fundamentally the most rational approach to preventing the use of these 
weapons, as well as others of mass destruction. Beyond relying on the rationality of 
beginning a global disarmament process, Japan can appeal to humanitarian principles and 
to the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.
To help involve the United States in a disarmament process, which is necessary if 
France and Great Britain are to follow suit, Tokyo could change the way it has conducted 
relations with Washington. Because the United States has provided security to Japan, 
Tokyo has frequently conceded to American trade and related economic demands for 
decades. With a new international security structure in place, Tokyo could make its 
consideration of concessions contingent upon the United States seriously exploring 
avenues to participate in good faith in a global disarmament process.
It has been pointed out that to move in the direction of nuclear disarmament the 
United States and Russia must demonstrate responsible leadership.50 Without the 
participation of the United States and Russia, a global disarmament process would have 
little meaning. But this does not mean that other nations have to be alienated from the 
disarmament process. While Japan cannot lead in the actual process of reducing and 
eliminating nuclear weapons, since it does not possess them, it can lead in designing an 
agenda for disarmament. In fact, because of its peace constitution and the decision not to
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possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into the country (the Three Non­
nuclear Principles, adopted in 1968), Japan is well suited to design and even arbitrate a 
global disarmament process.
In assuming this role, Japan can not only exploit the “culture of peace,” which has 
been declared by the U.N. General Assembly to mark the first decade of the coming
c |
millenium, but it can also hasten the improvement of relations with China. China’s 
official foreign policy position states that it “stands for the comprehensive prohibition 
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.”52 Beijing has very recently stressed the 
importance of accelerating the nuclear disarmament process.53 In November 1998 Tokyo 
&nd Beijing agreed to a Joint Declaration which states that: “Both sides stress the 
importance of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.”54 Sino-Japanese relations 
would improve if Japan constructed and became a staunch advocate of an international 
disarmament process within the United Nations that centered on the abolition of all 
nuclear weapons.55
Similarly, improved relations with Pyongyang would result from Japan’s 
leadership role in a nuclear disarmament process, along with the greater assurance from 
North Korea that it will not develop nuclear weapons. North Korea has recently stressed 
that it favors a new non-proliferation treaty that makes it obligatory that the nuclear 
powers eliminate nuclear weapons. North Korea has recognized that many Japanese 
desire a nuclear-free world and has called on Tokyo to respond to the people’s will.56
Russo-Japanese relations would also improve as a result of a sustained 
disarmament initiative by Tokyo. The recent suggestion by Washington that it may 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has caused Moscow to further delay the ratification of
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START II. By fashioning and supporting a multilateral disarmament agenda and by 
dropping out of the TMD initiative, Japan would be demonstrating unequivocal good will 
that Russia could not ignore.
Conclusions
Japan falls short of being recognized as a true superpower by most, if not all, 
nations, since it is not a sophisticated military and nuclear power. This however, is not 
an unalterable situation. Japan could militarize itself, or it could work to demonstrate that 
a superpower image does not have to be equated with military power.
Symbolized by Article 9, Japan has shown a strong commitment to pacifism 
throughout the postwar period, Japanese culture remains anti-militarist and anti-nuclear. 
Moreover, Japan still views that the United Nations as an institution that needs to be 
strengthened so that it can effectively operationalize its international security 
mechanisms.
Japan can find the international role that it has been seeking for the past several 
years and at the same time acquire the status of a superpower by taking responsible steps 
to create a disarmament process. One of the first steps that Japan needs to make to begin 
this process is to announce that it intends to end its security alliance with the United 
States. Japan can show that advancements in science and technology can not only support 
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